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Are Franchisors Joint Employers under the NLRA?
Maryssa Mataras*

Part I: Introduction
The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or “the Act”)1 defines the term “employer”
to include “any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly”.2 The modern
business landscape has evolved to encompass conglomerates, parent corporations, subsidiaries,
and franchises, and as a result, “the traditional employer-employee relationship” has become
muddled.3 Various legal doctrines have developed to address the complexity, depth, and
multidimensionality of employment issues in the business sector.4
The “joint employer” doctrine, although not expressly defined in the NLRA, is a legal
principle that expands the notion of “employer.”5 In essence, the National Labor Relations
Board (“NRLB” or “the Board”)6 or a court may deem legally separate and independent business
entities to be the joint employers of an aggrieved employee. This will occur when the two
entities “share or co-determine those matters governing the essential terms and conditions of

*J.D. Candidate, 2016, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., magna cum laude, 2011, Union College.
1
29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2015). The author will use “NLRA” or “the Act” to collectively refer to the National Labor
Relations (Wagner) Act of July 5, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), the Labor-Management Relations
(Taft-Hartley) Act of June 23, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), and the Labor-Management Reporting
& Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 518 (1959).
2
29 U.S.C.A. § 152 (West 2015). The definition excludes the United States, Government-owned corporations, the
Federal Reserve Bank, states or political subdivisions, labor organizations, or “anyone acting in the capacity of
officer or agent of such labor organization.” Id.
3
Airborne Express, 338 N.L.R.B. 597, 599 (2002) (Member Liebman, concurring); see also Jeffrey M. Hirsch &
Barry T. Hirsch, The Rise and Fall of Private Sector Unionism: What Next for the NLRA?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
1133, 1140–45 (2007) (identifying modern workplace management techniques and proposing alternatives that result
in increased relevance for the NLRA).
4
See N.L.R.B. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pa., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1121–24 (3d Cir. 1982) (explaining and
distinguishing the “single employer” and the “joint employer” doctrines).
5
See Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 475 (1964) (discussing the Supreme Court’s iteration of the joint
employer doctrine).
6
The National Labor Relations Board consists of five members appointed by the President and approved by the
Senate. 29 U.S.C.A. § 153 (West 2015). The Board serves to review Administrative Law Judges’ recommendations
and findings of facts after a hearing of complaints under the NLRA, and issue decisions. ARCHIBALD COX ET AL.,
LABOR LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 68 (15th ed. 2011).

employment”7 and have “historically chosen to handle jointly . . . important aspects of their
employer-employee relationship.”8 In such cases, the two business entities, although otherwise
viewed by the law as separate, are both, in the eyes of the law, considered employers of a
particular individual and both entities must be held to the obligations of employers under the Act.
Shared decision-making in matters governing the essential terms and condition of
employment is the foundation of the current joint employer test under the NLRA which was
articulated in 1982 by the Third Circuit in N.L.R.B. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pennsylvania,
Inc.9 Shortly after, in 1984, the NLRB adopted the Third Circuit’s joint employer test.10 Yet, the
Board expanded on the Third Circuit’s standard by defining essential terms and conditions of
employment as those “such as hiring, firing, disciplining, supervision, and direction of
employees”11 and requiring the putative joint employer’s control over these terms and conditions
of employment to be direct and immediate.12 Prior to 1984 the joint employer analysis under the
NLRA was “somewhat more amorphous,”13 with a variety of standards, depending on
jurisdiction. Despite the initial variations among the standards, the current joint employer test
had remained settled law under the NLRA for thirty years.14
In April of 2014, however, the NLRB issued a formal notice that it would accept amicus
briefs to address the Board’s longstanding joint employer standard articulated in TLI, Inc. and

7

N.L.R.B. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pennsylvania, Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1123 (3d Cir. 1982) citing C.R. Adams
Trucking, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 563 (1982), Ref-Chem Co. v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 127, 129 (5th Cir. 1969), and NLRB v.
Greyhound Corp., 368 F.2d 778, 780 (5th Cir. 1966).
8
N.L.R.B. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pennsylvania, Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1122 (3d Cir. 1982) quoting. N.L.R.B. v.
Checker Cab Co., 367 F.2d 692, 698 (6th Cir. 1966).
9
N.L.R.B. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pennsylvania, Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1123 (3d Cir. 1982).
10
TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 798 (1984), enfd. 772 D.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1985); Laerco Transportation, 269 N.L.R.B. 324,
325 (1984).
11
Laerco Transportation, 269 N.L.R.B. 324, 325 (1984).
12
TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 798, 798-99 (1984); also see Airborne Express, 338 N.L.R.B. 597 n.1 (2002) for the
Board’s majority noting the requirement direct and immediate control in its joint employer analysis.
13
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. & Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, Indus. & Allied Workers Helpers Loc.
Un. No. 920, 312 N.L.R.B. 674, 676 (1993).
14
Airborne Express, 338 N.L.R.B. 597 (2002) (refusing to alter the joint employer standard).

Lacero Transportation.15 This indicated the Board’s reconsideration of the existing standard.
The briefs were to consider whether the Board should adhere to the existing joint employer
standard or adopt a new one, and accepted proposals as to what the new standard should be.16
And despite another longstanding precedent that franchisors are not typically joint employers
with their franchisees, several Regional Offices of the National Labor Relations Board17 have
since issued unfair labor practice complaints against McDonald’s USA, LLC, one of the world’s
largest and best known franchisors, as a “joint employer respondent”.18 It is possible that these
Regional Offices of the NLRB have changed their joint employer standard in issuing these
complaints, yet, it is also possible that the facts and circumstances with respect to this franchisor
led the Regional Offices to deem McDonald’s USA, LLC a putative joint employer without
altering its well-settled joint employer test. Additionally, in February of 2015 the Senate
Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions held a full hearing on the issue of the joint

Notice and Invitation to File Briefs Regarding the Board’s Current Joint Employer Standard Under TLI, Inc., 271
N.L.R.B. 798 (1984), enfd. mem. 772 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1985), and Laerco Transportation, 269 N.L.R.B. 324 (1984),
National Labor Relations Board (May 12, 2014), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrbinvites-briefs-joint-employment-standard.
16
Id.
17
Since November 2012 at least 310 unfair labor practice charges were made against McDonald’s, USA, LLC filed
in Regions 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 25, 27, 28, and 31. Fact Sheet, McDonald’s Fact
Sheet, National Labor Relations Board Office of the General Counsel, available at http://www.nlrb.gov/newsoutreach/fact-sheets/mcdonalds-fact-sheet. Of those charges, 149 have been closed, 54 are pending investigation as
to the merits of the claim, and 107 have been found have merit and approximately 10 of the meritorious cases have
been made against corporate-owned McDonald’s storefronts. Id. The 107 meritorious charges against McDonald’s,
USA, LLC have been filed in Regions 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 13, 14, 15, 18, 20, 21, 25, 28, and 31. Id. And in December
2014, the NLRB Office of the General Counsel issued a statement that it will consolidate the meritorious charges
against McDonald’s franchisees and their franchisor, McDonald’s, USA, LLC, to take place in a few NLRB
Regional Offices throughout the country. Press Release, NLRB Office of the General Counsel Issues Consolidated
Complaints Against McDonald's Franchisees and their Franchisor McDonald's, USA, LLC as Joint Employers,
National Labor Relations Board, (Dec 19, 2014), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrboffice-general-counsel-issues-consolidated-complaints-against.
18
See Press Release, NLRB Office of the General Counsel Authorizes Complaints Against McDonald's Franchisees
and Determines McDonald's, USA, LLC is a Joint Employer, National Labor Relations Board, (July 29, 2014),
available at http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-office-general-counsel-authorizes-complaintsagainst-mcdonalds; see Press Release, NLRB Office of the General Counsel Issues Consolidated Complaints
Against McDonald's Franchisees and their Franchisor McDonald's, USA, LLC as Joint Employers, National Labor
Relations Board, (Dec 19, 2014), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-office-generalcounsel-issues-consolidated-complaints-against.
15

employer standard under the NLRA, and specifically mentioned the issues of this standard the
context of franchises.19
This comment will articulate the history of the joint employer doctrine in the context of
franchises and will investigate the potential reasoning behind the recent (potential) change of
position that several of the Regional Offices have made regarding the joint employer status of
franchisors. And lastly, it will suggest a new franchise-specific joint employer standard that
requires a franchisor’s direct and actual control over the instrumentality of the employee’s
alleged harm. Part II of this comment will provide the general overview of the joint employer
doctrine under the National Labor Relations Act. Part III will explain the commercial nature of
franchises noting its unique intersection of franchisors’ control over their franchisees and
franchisees’ independence. Part IV discusses the consequences of maintaining the same joint
employer standard and of adopting the former joint employer standard; and will then propose a
new joint employer standard unique to franchises.
Part II: Joint Employer Doctrine Under the NLRA
1. The Current Joint Employer Standard Under the NLRA
The Supreme Court articulated that the joint employer determination must be a factual
inquiry to determine whether the putative joint employer displayed a “sufficient indicia of
control”20 over the employee.21 Following this precedent, prior to 1984, the courts and Board

Who’s the Boss? The “Joint Employer” Standard and Business Ownership: Hearing Before the Full Sen. Comm.
on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 114th Cong. (2015) (where leaders of the Committee and witnesses,
including a law professor, a lawyer, and franchise owners, evaluated and pontificated on the consequences of
maintaining or changing the current joint employer standard); see Catherine Ruckelshaus & Mike Munoz, Who's the
Boss? Why Republicans Are Missing the Point on Joint Employer, Huffington Post (Feb. 6, 2015, 5:36 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/catherine-ruckelshaus/joint-employment_b_6633602.html (for a critique on the
Republican committee members calling for the Board to maintain the current joint employer standard).
20
Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 481 (1964).
21
See Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964) (remanding to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for further
proceedings to assess the factual circumstances regarding the level of control of Greyhound, a company that
operates bus terminals, and Floors, Inc. a corporation that provides cleaning and maintenance services to
19

implemented several varying tests to determine the sufficiency of control that would properly
warrant a joint employer determination under the NLRA.22 The varying tests, however, each
weighed the importance of certain factors differently or exclusively analyzed certain factors in its
inquiry. The Second Circuit looked to a putative joint employer’s immediate control over
employees with respect to hiring, firing, discipline, pay, insurance, records, supervision and
participation in the collective bargaining process.23 The Third and Fifth Circuits looked to
“whether the employer shared or codetermined matters governing the employees' essential terms
and conditions of employment.”24 The Fourth Circuit analyzed the sufficiency of control over
the employee’s work.25 The Eighth Circuit, endorsed a four-factor test of (1) common
ownership, (2) common management, (3) interrelation of operations, and (4) centralized control
of labor relations.26 The Ninth Circuit focused on the level of the employer’s authority over
“authority over employment conditions, which are within the area of mandatory collective
bargaining.”27 And the D.C. Circuit looked to “the amount of actual and potential control” 28 the
putative joint employer has over the employees. The putative joint employer’s control could be

Greyhound, exercise over porters, janitors, and maids, to determine whether a bargaining unit consisting of such
employees under the alleged joint employer relationship is appropriate).
22
Clinton's Ditch Co-op Co. v. N.L.R.B., 778 F.2d 132, 137–38 (2d Cir. 1985) (comparing the joint employer
standards under the NLRA among the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits).
23
Clinton's Ditch Co-op Co. v. N.L.R.B., 778 F.2d 132, 137-40 (2d Cir. 1985) citing International House v. NLRB,
676 F.2d 906, 912 (2d Cir.1982) for its standard.
24
Clinton's Ditch Co-op Co. v. N.L.R.B., 778 F.2d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 1985) citing NLRB v. Browning-Ferris
Industries of Pennsylvania, Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1123 (3d Cir.1982); Ref-Chem Company v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 127,
129 (5th Cir.1969).
25
Clinton's Ditch Co-op Co. v. N.L.R.B., 778 F.2d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 1985) citing NLRB v. Jewell Smokeless Coal
Corp., 435 F.2d 1270, 1271 (4th Cir. 1970).
26
Clinton's Ditch Co-op Co. v. N.L.R.B., 778 F.2d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 1985) citing Pulitzer Publishing Co. v. NLRB,
618 F.2d 1275, 1279 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 875 [101 S.Ct. 217, 66 L.Ed.2d 96]
27
Clinton's Ditch Co-op Co. v. N.L.R.B., 778 F.2d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 1985) citing Sun Maid Growers v. NLRB, 618
F.2d 56, 59 (9th Cir.1980); mandatory subjects of bargaining expressly includes “wages, hours, and other conditions
of employment[.]” 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (West 2015).
28
Clinton's Ditch Co-op Co. v. N.L.R.B., 778 F.2d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 1985) citing International Chemical Workers
Union Local 483 v. NLRB, 561 F.2d 253, 255 (D.C. Cir.1977).

direct, in that it directly and jointly controlled labor relations, or indirect, in that it sufficiently
controlled the other employer in its decisions regarding its labor relations.29
Since the NLRB articulated the current joint employment test under the NLRA in 1984 in
TLI, Inc. and Lacero Transportation the standard for joint employment has continued to be that a
putative entity is a joint employer if it jointly shares or co-determines matters governing the
essential terms and conditions of employment,30 such as hiring, firing, disciplining, supervision,
and direction of employees.31 And the Board has stated that the control over these matters must
be direct and immediate.32 It is likely that the 1984 standard narrowed the scope of joint
employment, by requiring direct and immediate control, meaning that entities could exercise
indirect control over the employment relations of another entity without being named a joint
employer.
A substantive and large body of law has formed under the NLRB’s 30-year-old current
joint employer standard, especially with respect to franchises, contractors, and employment
services agencies, because the traditional notions of the employer-employee relationship are
blurred in these contexts.33 This body of law focuses on the levels of control that warrant joint
employer status.
The Board determined that the joint employment concept is independent of the single
employer or integrated enterprise doctrine;34 therefore, the finding of joint employer status is not

29

See Floyd Epperson, 202 N.L.R.B. 23, 24–28 (1973), enforced mem., 491 F.2d 1390 (6th Cir. 1974) for examples
of indirect and direct control.
30
TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 798, 802 –03 (1984) citing N.L.R.B. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pennsylvania, Inc., 691
F.2d 1117 (3d Cir. 1982).
31
Laerco Transportation, 269 N.L.R.B. 324, 325 (1984).
32
See Laerco Transportation, 269 N.L.R.B. 324 (1984); see TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 798, 798–99 (1984); also see
Airborne Express, 338 N.L.R.B. 597 n.1 (2002) for the Board’s majority noting the requirement direct and
immediate control in its joint employer analysis.
33
Airborne Express, 338 N.L.R.B. 597 (2002) (Member Liebman, concurring).
34
The single employer doctrine is a legal concept that treats two separate business entities as one when both entities
are sufficiently integrated. Radio & Television Broad. Technicians Local Union 1264 v. Broad. Serv. of Mobile,

contingent upon the two (or more) employers being heavily integrated so that the entity can be
viewed as one single integrated entity and therefore one single employer.35
With respect to employment agencies, the joint employer determination is a fact-sensitive
inquiry regarding a sufficiency of control. Joint employment status was affirmed by the Sixth
Circuit when an employment agency leased drivers to handle the transportation needs of a
manufacturing company when the manufacturer had substantial day-today control over the
drivers’ working conditions, wages, benefits, hiring and firing.36 The NLRB, however, found
that an employee was solely employed by an employment agency, and denied joint employment
status, when the agency referred and placed an employee in a milk processing plant for
employment when the processing company instructed the employee of when and where to take
his breaks, disciplined the employee about his excessive break times and terminated the
employee but maintained a timecard for the agency’s use.37
With respect to employment agencies,38 the NLRB found that two entities were no longer
joint employers when they started to disentangle by one employer’s ceasing control over the
daily operations of the employees, stopping twice-daily joint supervisory meetings, and requiring
each entity to have its own telephone and automobiles to transfer employees.39 The NLRB also
established in the same case, that an entity is not liable for unlawful conduct that occurs before or

Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256 (1965). This analysis often evaluates “interrelation of operations, common management,
centralized control of labor relations and common ownership” between the two independent businesses. Id.
35
Martiki Coal Corp., 315 N.L.R.B. 476, 477 (1994); see N.L.R.B. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pennsylvania, Inc.,
691 F.2d 1117 (3d Cir. 1982) for an analysis of the distinctions between the single employer and joint employer
doctrines.
36
Carrier Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 768 F.2d 778, 781–82 (6th Cir. 1985).
37
Flav-O-Rich, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 262, 264–65 (1992).
38
An employment agency is any entity that is in the business of finding employment and brokers labor for a fee.
Garson v. Div. of Labor Enforcement, Dep't of Indus. Relations, 33 Cal. 2d 861, 863, 206 P.2d 368, 369 (1949);
Florida Indus. Commission v. Manpower, Inc. of Miami, 91 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 1956).
39
Martiki Coal Corp., 315 N.L.R.B. 476, 477–78 (1994).

after an entity is a joint employer; and therefore is liable only for conduct that occurs while the
two entities retain joint employer status.40
There is a significant amount of law regarding joint employment under the NLRA for
contracting and subcontracting work.41 Under the rules of agency, an individual or entity hiring
an independent contractor does not necessarily exercise enough control to deem the independent
contractor an agent of the individual or entity.42 As such, the latter is not usually vicariously
liable for the conduct of the independent contractor.43 As might be expected, however, labeling a
company as an independent contractor in the context of the NLRA requires a more detailed
analysis.44 The NLRB will conduct an inquiry into the indicia of control, as it would with any
alleged joint employers, to determine whether or not the two entities are, in fact, joint
employers.45
A business that contracts work to another entity is a joint employer with the contractor
when the business “jointly shares or co-determines matters governing the essential terms and
conditions of employment.”46 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the NLRB’s finding that a contractor of
janitorial services, and the company utilizing those services, are joint employers when: (1) the

40

Id.
See generally Cabot Corp., 223 N.L.R.B. 1388 (1976); Thums Long Beach Co. 295 N.L.R.B. 101 (1989); Solid
Waste Services, Inc. 313 N.L.R.B. 385 (1993).
42
An independent contractor may or may not be an agent of the hiring entity or person and “contracts with another
to do something for him but who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the other's right to control with respect
to his physical conduct in the performance of the undertaking. He may or may not be an agent.” Restatement
(Second) of Agency § 2 (1958).
43
See Vagle v. Pickands Mather & Co., 611 F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1979) (noting the potential forms of liability for
companies that hire independent contractors); Ackerman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 555 F. Supp. 93, 94 (D.N.D. 1982)
(denying defendant’s motion to dismiss because the record indicated a genuine issue of material fact regarding the
level of control defendant had over a contractor’s employee).
44
An analysis regarding the vicarious liability of an entity that hires an independent contractor is a fact intensive
inquiry regarding the level of control and typically no single factor or controlling, including the labeling of an entity
as an independent contractor is not dispositive. Slayman v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 1033, 1037
(9th Cir. 2014); Interstate Fire & Cas. Co. v. Washington Hosp. Ctr. Corp., 758 F.3d 378, 381 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
45
Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 475 (1964).
46
TLI, Inc., 271 NLRB 798, 798–99 (1984) citing N.L.R.B v. Browning-Ferris Industries, 691 F.2d 1117 (3d Cir.
1982).
41

company influences the contractor’s hiring and firing decisions,47 (2) the company has control
over the contractor’s employment policies and; (3) the contractor’s employees seek to unionize,
the company participates in the collective bargaining process and hires (and exclusively pays for)
a labor relations consultant.48 In contrast, a different janitorial services contractor is not a joint
employer with a property management firm when the management firm merely retains the right
to review performance of the janitors and checks the janitor’s work each day, while the
contractor provides its own supervisor who assigns tasks to the janitors each day.49
Franchises, like contractors and employment agencies, also fall into a category in which
the traditional, single-employer notion is blurred50 and joint employment status is possible. The
aforementioned cases demonstrate that finding joint employment with respect to employment
agencies and contractors varies depending on the factual circumstances. The NLRB’s joint
employer inquiry in the context of franchises has been somewhat consistent,51 i.e., franchisors
and their franchisees are not joint employers. Even prior to 1984, when indirect control was
sufficient for joint employment, courts and the Board determined that franchisors are not joint
employers because franchisors are given more flexibility in their control for the sake of
protecting their brand and its uniformity.52 For example, when a franchisor enters into a
franchise agreement in which franchisees agree to maintain certain standards of the company

47

Texas World Service Co. v. N.L.R.B, 928 F.2d 1426, 1433 (5th Cir. 1991).
Id.
49
Serv. Employees Union, 312 N.L.R.B. 715, 736 (1993).
50
Airborne Express, 338 N.L.R.B. 597 (2002) (Member Liebman, concurring).
51
Richard Griffin Jr., General Counsel, National Labor Relations Board, Keynote Speech at the West Virginia
University College of Law Labor Law Conference 2014: Zealous Advocacy for Social Change (October 24, 2014),
available at
http://wvulaw.mediasite.com/Mediasite/Play/31e143f0990647558b0268e9086ca3e41d?catalog=7e011120-398b494f-8ce8-9e0aa870d371.
52
Id.; Love’s Barbeque Rest. 245 N.L.R.B. 78, 120 (1978); Tilden, S. G., Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 752, 753 (1968);
Speedee 7-Eleven, 170 N.L.R.B. 1332, 1333 (1968); Yellow Cab Co., 208 N.L.R.B. 1020, 1021 (1974); see Robert
W. Emerson, Franchising and the Collective Rights of Franchisees, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1503, 1528 (1990).
48

with respect to housekeeping and pricing, and the franchisor does not exercise “direct control
over the labor relations” of the franchisees, there is no joint employment53 And again, the NLRB
ruled that a franchisor and franchisee were not joint employers when the franchisor paid the
employees and provided recommendations for employment relations but did not have the right to
exercise control over such relations.54 These two cases, both decided by the NLRB in 1968,
became the most precedential cases with respect to joint employment among franchisees and
franchisors.55
In short, once the current and narrower standard was promulgated, which requires direct
control by the putative joint employer, franchisors have not been found to be joint employers
because their control is derived from their relationship with the franchisee exclusively and not
directly with the employees.56 The NLRB’s recent issuance of several unfair labor practice
complaints against a franchisor, McDonald’s USA LLC, however, demonstrated the possibility
of turning this well-settled notion on its head.57
2. Consequences of Joint Employer Status Under the NLRA
Joint employers are held to the same statutory obligations as single employers.58 Under
the NLRA, the obligations of employers are plentiful. An employer falling under the jurisdiction
of the Act may not interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the right to, and

53

Tilden, S. G., Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 752, 753 (1968).
Speedee 7-Eleven, 170 N.L.R.B. 1332, 1333 (1968).
55
Tilden, 172 N.L.R.B. at 753; Speedee, 170 N.L.R.B. at 1333.
56
This finding is not exclusive to franchises. See Cynatron Enters., 216 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1120 (1975) (holding that
two entities were not joint employers when one company had no direct control, but only indirect control, by virtue of
a contract).
57
Press Release, NLRB Office of the General Counsel, NLRB Office of the General Counsel Issues Consolidated
Complaints Against McDonald's Franchisees and their Franchisor McDonald's, USA, LLC as Joint Employers (Dec
19, 2014), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-office-general-counsel-issuesconsolidated-complaints-against.
58
Additionally, as joint employers, each entity “is responsible for the conduct of the other and whatever unlawful
practices are engaged in by the one must be deemed to have been committed by both.” Hillside Manor Health
Related Facility, 257 NLRB 981, 985 (1981) (citing Ref-Chem Co.,169 N.L.R.B. 376, 380 (1968)).
54

the right to refrain from, self-organization, bargaining collectively and engaging in concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.59 Employers
are also required to bargain in good faith regarding certain subjects of employment.60 Finally,
covered employers may not exert domination over the labor organizations formed by the
employees61 and may not discriminate among union and nonunion workers, materials or
information.62
The jurisdiction of the NLRA for employers is typically contingent upon on two
elements—the industry of the employer63 and its affect on interstate commerce, in quantitative
monetary terms.64 “[I]t is well established that the commerce data of joint or single employers
may appropriately be combined for jurisdictional purposes.”65 Accordingly, there are instances
in which an employer is not within the NLRA when independent but, when said employer
becomes a joint employer with another entity, the two employers, together, meet the
jurisdictional requirement of affecting commerce under the NLRA.66 Therefore, the employees
of the joint employers that now meet the jurisdictional requirements of the Act are awarded the
rights to self-organize, unionize, collectively bargain, and engage in concerted activities for

59

29 U.S.C.A. § 157 (West 2015) (granting employees rights); 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (West 2015) (making it an unfair
labor practice to violate § 157 rights).
60
29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (West 2015); these subjects are called the mandatory subjects of bargaining and include
“wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment” and require that the parties exercise good faith with
respect to these aforementioned subjects. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(d) (West 2015).
61
29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (West 2015).
62
29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (West 2015).
63
29 U.S.C.A. § 152(6),(7) (West 2015).
64
ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 54 (15th ed. 2011).
65
Valentine Properties, 319 N.L.R.B 8 (1995) citing 73–381 South Broadway Associates, 304 N.L.R.B. 1108
(1991).
66
See Hudson Ridge Owners Corp. & Hudson Ridge Owners Corp., 313 NLRB 1055, 1058 (1994) (noting that one
of two joint employers independently does not meet the jurisdictional requirement of $500,000 in gross receipts
under the Act but as joint employer with another entity, the two entities, together, meet the $500,000 threshold and
therefore together fall within the jurisdiction of the Act).

mutual aid and protection of the employees, whereas they were not afforded these rights before
its employer became a joint employer with another entity.67
The power to unionize is likely the most significant right granted to employees under the
NLRA. Since the NLRB’s recent naming of McDonald’s as a joint employer with several of its
franchisees, the possibility for unionization has increased.68
With respect to collective bargaining, a union that wins a representation election is
approximately 40-50% likely to create a contract with an employer; whereas, if a union loses an
election, the probability for reaching a collective bargaining agreement is around 10%.69 In
terms of employee earnings, where most of the research of impact of unionization is focused,
earlier studies found a large wage disparity between union and nonunion workers in the same
position and industry.70 More recent studies, however, have undercut these findings.71 As of
late, several different studies have concluded that unionization has little affect on average
wages.72 But one author notes that unionization “significantly compresses the distribution of
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employee earnings,”73 meaning that those at the bottom of the wages scale for a particular
employer may experience an increase in pay whereas those at the top may see no change at all or
a decrease in salary.74 Another study agrees, finding that, “wage differentials by age, education,
and region are typically smaller for unionized workers.”75 Yet another study indicates that
unionization does not seem to affect employment rates but companies that did unionize,
experienced slower growth rates than those entities that did not.76 One analysis concluded,
however, that an election that results in favor of unionization decreases the value of the
company’s stock by at least $40,500 per voter, meaning that investors appear hostile to
unionization.77 As one can tell, the jury is still out regarding the exact impacts of organization
on wages but the economic analyses.
Part III: Franchises
Franchising is a method of selling and marketing goods and services that creates a
network of independently owned businesses that have the right to sell the products or services of
another, usually larger and well-known, business entity. 78 This method of business expansion
has experienced dramatic growth in the last half-century and has significant impact on the
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company growth, and fewer economic opportunities for the company. Id. at 36.
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nation’s economy, especially in the retail industry.79 In 2007, franchised businesses directly
contributed over 9 million jobs and $468 billion GDP80 to the U.S. economy.81
The International Franchise Association defines a franchise as an “agreement or license
between two legally independent parties” which gives:
[1] a person or group of people (franchisee) the right to market a product or service using
the trademark or trade name of another business (franchisor); [2] the franchisee the right
to market a product or service using the operating methods of the franchisor; [3] the
franchisee the obligation to pay the franchisor fees for these rights; [and 4] the franchisor
the obligation to provide rights and support to franchisees.”82
The relationship between the franchisee and franchisor is created through a contract,
typically called a Franchise Agreement.83 These contracts tend to have several standard terms in
which the franchisee: (1) accepts managerial assistance from the franchisors; (2) agrees to run
the business in a manner delineated by the franchisor; (3) pays royalties, usually in a percentage
of sales to the franchisor; and (4) agrees to a termination clause usual at the will of the
franchisor.84
The franchise model has the overarching structure of licensing an independent business
owner to sell certain products or services and has two most popular formats—product
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franchising and business format franchising.85 The structure of the relationship between the
franchisor and franchisee, however, varies greatly, depending on the terms and conditions of the
agreement.86
There are advantages and disadvantages of franchising. The franchisor typically bears
the national advertising costs and the burden of the mechanisms and infrastructure to ensure
quality and management standards.87 The franchisor is able to expand its business more quickly
than it would without a franchise arrangement because the initial capital to establish an outlet is
obtained by the franchisee, allowing the franchisor to receive royalty payments for a fraction of
the effort and costs required to run an entire store.88 Franchisees make smaller profit margins
because of royalty payments made to the franchisor and are confined to the limitations and
control set out by the franchisor.89 Yet, franchisees run their business on a brand that already
has, hopefully, legitimacy, good will, and integrity; an existing brand reduces amount of risk for
a franchisee.90 And often the franchisor requires and provides a predetermined infrastructure,
while franchisees still get the opportunity to manage their own stores.91 Franchises also benefit
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the public. Aside from job opportunities, franchises provide a uniform quality of their product or
services, and consumers can expect a standard of quality when entering any of the franchised
stores.92
The business format franchise is the most popular franchise model, most commonly
employed by fast food restaurants and convenience stores.93 This model licenses a franchisee to
use and sell a franchisor’s products, services, or trademark and “the complete method to conduct
the business itself.”94 Typically the franchisee pays an initial large licensing fee.95 The
franchisee typically agrees to adhere to the quality and control standards of the franchisor,
observe the franchisor’s uniform format, and pay royalty payments to the franchisor.96 The
franchisor will typically provide training, operation manuals, standards, and advertising.97
In contrast, product distribution franchises sell and distribute the franchisor’s products.
The “franchisor licenses its trademark and logo to the franchisees but typically does not provide
them with an entire system for running their business.”98 This format of franchising is most
commonly found in the automobile, gasoline and soft drink industries.99
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Given the structure of franchising, with the unique dichotomy of the franchisee’s
autonomy and the franchisor’s ability to control facets of the franchisee’s business, the
traditional notions of a single employer, in the franchise context, have become muddled.
Nevertheless, the NLRB had somewhat consistently refused to name a franchisor a joint
employer with its franchisees in the past but this precedent may change in light of the NLRB’s
recent complaint naming McDonald’s USA LLC, a joint employer with several of its
franchisees.100
Part IV: The Same, the Old, or a New Joint Employer Standard of the NLRA? and Its
Effect on Franchises
In light of the NLRB’s request for briefs on the joint employer doctrine, there has been
speculation that it may depart from its long-standing joint employer standard promulgated in
1984—that a joint employer must exert direct and immediate control in jointly sharing and codetermining matters governing the essential terms and conditions of employment,101 such as
hiring, firing, disciplining, supervision, and direction of employees.102 Among the briefs, several
amici suggest that the Board should maintain its current joint employer status.103 Others contend
that the current standard is too narrow and should be broadened to include levels of control that

This is not to say that franchisors cannot be joint employers with entities beside their franchisees. See Dunkin’
Donuts Mid-Atlantic Distribution Center, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 363 F.3d 437 (2004) (holding that a Dunkin’ Donuts
distribution center which shopped products to retail stores was a joint employer with a company from which it
leased trick drivers and warehouse employees); see Parklane Hoisery Co., 203 NLRB 597 (1973) overruled by citing
N.L.R.B. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pennsylvania, Inc., 691 F.2d 1117 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding a franchisor and
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for Coalition for a Democratic Workplace et al. as Amici Curiae, Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pennsylvania, Inc., 259
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for Professors of Labor and Employment Law as Amici Curiae, Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pennsylvania, Inc., 259
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are indirect. These arguments and conflicting opinions regarding the joint employer doctrine are
not new to the Board.104
1. What would maintaining the same joint employer standard mean for franchises?
If the current joint employer standard is maintained, two results may follow: (1) the
standard will continue insulating franchisors from joint employer status and thus NLRA
jurisdiction or (2) the facts and circumstances regarding direct control of certain franchisors will
lead the Board to deem at least some franchisors joint employers with their franchisees. If the
current standard is maintained, most franchisors will continue to avoid joint employer status.
The focus of this section will be the latter possibility under the current standard.
Historically, franchisors controlled their franchisees through mandatory guidelines,
quality control standards, and policies.105 In turn, as the franchisees adhered to these obligations
set forth by the franchisor, these procedures affected the labor relations between the franchisee
and its employees.106 Hence, the type of control that franchisors have over the employees of
their franchisees is indirect, which does not meet the requirements of the current joint employer
standard.107 Because of the chain of control—from the franchisor to the franchisee, then from
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the franchisee to its employees—is indirect, the franchisor was not a joint employer with its
franchisees under the NLRA.108
It appears, however, that in light of technological advancements, some franchisors may
have the capacity to control employees in a new and more direct manner.109 Franchisors with
direct and immediate control over labor relations that jointly share or co-determine matters
governing the essential terms and conditions of employment will be named joint employers with
their franchisees even if the current standard remains.110 With new computer software programs
that contain real-time information on gross sales and minute-by-minute labor costs, some
franchisors now have the capacity to signal employees to leave for the day, completing their
shift.111 A recent New Yorker article recounts the details of McDonald’s nationwide scheduling
software, which is speculated to have contributed to the Board’s recent complaint naming
McDonald’s and several its franchisees joint employers.112 “The crew scheduling software used
by McDonald’s is reputed to be sophisticated, but to the workers it seems mindless and opaque.
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The coming week’s schedule is posted on Saturday evenings.”113 One employee noted that the
schedules in the McDonald’s location that she works are no longer posted and that her manager
instead hands her a “thin strip of paper . . . like the stuff that comes out of a shredder” with each
individual’s schedule.114
Technology has changed the nature of employment everywhere. A franchisor may now
have the capacity to be more directly involved in labor relations between the franchisee and
employees. This means that, if franchisors utilize technology in way that directly and jointly
affects the terms and conditions of employment they will be subject to joint employer status.115
Most franchisors, however, do not use such intrusive technology and, if the current standard
remains, the status quo will remain for them as well. Yet, the Board may deem franchisors joint
employers with their franchisees if the former demonstrate direct control over the employees of
the latter.116
2. What would a readopting the former, traditional joint employer standard mean for
franchises?
The pre-1984 joint employer standard would mark a return to “amorphous”117 test that
varied depending on jurisdiction.118 This standard evaluated the totality of the circumstances and
was rooted in the notion of a sufficient indication of control119 but took on many different forms
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and varieties according to jurisdiction.120 It did not require direct and immediate control by the
putative joint employer121 and was thus a more inclusive than the current narrower test.122
Returning to a broader joint employer standard may have some complicating implications
for franchisors.123 Primarily, various standards, which further “complicate matters by attaching
vastly different weight to certain indicia of control,”124 create inconsistency in jurisdictions
throughout the same country under the same statute.125 The law under the NLRA would benefit
from referencing uniform rules and standards in its own case law.126 The broader standard was
discarded for, among other reasons, a lack of clarity and consistency in 1984.127 Moreover,
franchisors are often national companies, having their franchisees located throughout various
jurisdictions within the United States, and typically implement company-wide procedures and
policies. Franchisors may then need to alter their processes, depending on the jurisdiction,
throughout the country to obviate itself from obligations of the NRLA.128
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There should be a uniform standard, but the Board might have the power to pick among
the possibilities. In other words, the choice is not between the pre-1984 chaos and the current
situation but rather there is the possibility of the Board picking one of the earlier standards. The
courts would then have to give the standard Chevron deference – of course, before 1984, there
was no such deference.
It may be argued, however, that a less rigid standard is more equitable, because it looks to
the facts and circumstances of the level of control the putative joint employer has with respect to
labor relations, as opposed to direct control in only certain criteria, like hiring and firing.129 This
proposed standard may also be more consistent with the goals of the Act, since it is possible for
an entity to indirectly control subjects of bargaining, the collective bargaining process, and terms
and conditions of employment.130 And it has been argued that it is equitable to hold each party
that influences these areas of labor relations to the obligations of the NLRA.131 Franchisors
contend that they have no role in bargaining with employees because they do not control
employment relations.132 Franchisees who likely prefer autonomy in their business and
employment decisions may prefer the current standard.133 As franchisors are incentivized to
exclude themselves from their franchisees’ labor relations (because doing so excludes them from
NLRA jurisdiction), franchisees benefit by retaining control over their own employment
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procedures.134 Yet, franchisee employees likely prefer a broader standard because it would
possibly open up the resources of an entirely new entity, the franchisor, in the case of an injury,
for benefits, or increased wages, and rights under the NLRA.135
Strikingly, the broader standard may continue to insulate many franchisors from joint
employer determinations. The former standard permitted a finding of joint employment whether
the control of the putative joint employer was direct or indirect, and had a totality-of-thecircumstances approach.136 Franchisors were permitted to exercise levels of control that would
normally result in joint employer status because the courts stated the control was necessary for
franchisors to protect the integrity and goodwill of their brand.137 In fact, franchisors have a
duty to protect their trademark under the Lanham Act.138 The Board and courts, in applying the
broader standard, excused franchisors from a joint employer determination for their control
because doing so would potentially “penalize franchisors who must exercise a high degree of
control to protect their trade or service mark under the Lanham Act.”139
If Board adopts the broader test there are two possible implications for franchisors. First,
as we have seen previously, the franchisor may be deemed a joint employer for its indirect (or
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direct, but most likely indirect) control over its franchisee. But the Board or the courts may
excuse the franchisor from this status, as done in the past, because the control would be justified
as maintaining the integrity and brand of its trademark under the Lanham Act.140 Second, the
Board may decide that the inquiry is fact-specific and in evaluating the franchisor’s control over
its franchisee’s labor relations (direct or indirect) and hold, in some extraordinary cases, that the
franchisor’s control exceeds what is necessary to protect its brand and is therefore a joint
employer with its franchisees.141 If this broader standard is readopted, a franchisor’s indirect
control that exceeds the amount necessary to justify protecting its brand, will warrant the Board
to name a franchisor and its franchisee joint employers in an unfair labor practice complaint
under the NLRA.
3. An Entirely New Standard for Joint Employment With Respect to Franchises
Because of the unique combination of a franchisee’s autonomy and the franchisor’s
ability to control facets of the franchisee’s business, the NLRB should create an entirely new
joint employer standard exclusively applied to franchisors.142 As mentioned supra,143 the Board
and courts have historically treated franchisors differently from other business entities by
excusing them from joint employer status with their franchisees despite a sufficient level of
control because the control was needed to protect a trademark.144
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Following the precedent set by the Supreme Court, joint employment is a determination
of control.145 The Board should discard its requirement of direct control in its joint employer
analysis. The requirement of direct control excludes franchisors from becoming joint employers
because of the nature of their business model, which controls franchisees indirectly, but may
effectively impose policies upon its franchisees, which affects its employees. The mere fact that
franchisors implement their labor relations policies through their franchisee does not justify they
escaping joint employer responsibilities if they are able to effectively control terms and
conditions of employment.146
By relieving franchisors that indirectly control employment policies from joint employer
status, the Board permits franchisors “to escape the basic compromise that the NLRA generally
imposes . . . the requirement that they bargain collectively” with employees.147 Requiring direct
control therefore may defeat the purposes of the Act148 because it does not require a franchisor, a
party that has considerable influence on the bargaining process, to show up to the bargaining
table to bargain in good faith.149
Instead, I argue, the Board should examine franchisors’ effective and actual control in the
instrumentality that is the subject of the employees’ complaint in its joint employer standard.150
This new standard has three essential elements: effective control, actual control and the control is
of, specifically, the instrumentality of the complaint.

145

Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 475 (1964).
Who’s the Boss? The “Joint Employer” Standard and Business Ownership: Hearing Before the Full Sen. Comm.
on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 114th Cong. (2015)
147
Michael C. Harper, Defining the Economics Relationship Appropriate for Collective Bargaining, 30 BOSTON L.
REV., 329, 345 (1998).
148
Airborne Express, 338 N.L.R.B. 597 (2002).
149
Michael C. Harper, Defining the Economics Relationship Appropriate for Collective Bargaining, supra note _.
150
Note that this test is to be applied in the context of litigation.
146

Effective control removes the direct and indirect distinction that the Board has utilized
and follows the intentions of the Supreme Court because it has never opined on the need for
direct control to satisfy a joint employer standard.151 For example, “two former McDonald’s
managers recent went public with confessions of systematic wage theft claiming that pressure
from both franchisees and the corporation forced them to alter time sheets and compel employees
to work off the clock.”152 Pressure like this from both the franchisor and franchisees, here, was
effective in controlling activity under the NLRA whether direct or indirect.
Proponents of the current standard advocating for the requirement a direct level of control
in co-determining conditions of employment will claim that discarding the direct requirement
and replacing it with an “”effective” requirement will open up the possibility for parties who
have no control in the specific area of an allegation or subject to defend itself or negotiate. Those
arguing in favor of the broader standard will appreciate the ‘totality of the circumstances’
approach of this element of this proposed new test and agree that the direct/indirect distinction is
irrelevant if the face of effective control.
The next element of this proposed standard will evaluate the actual control of the
franchisor as a putative joint employer. This element is an inquiry into the franchisors’ actual
exercise of control and not its mere ability or right to control and borrows significantly from
franchisor vicarious liability for which there is a substantial amount of case law.153 Analyses of
vicarious liability and joint employment under the NLRA are both essentially determinations
made regarding a sufficiency of control.
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Because of the unique nature of franchising, the agreement between the franchisee and
franchisor permits the franchisor to have the right to control many elements of the franchisee’s
business. The agreements, manuals, and guidelines provided by the franchisor can be
voluminous and typically are. These documents help secure uniformity and protect its brand.
Some of these procedures are guidelines but not requirements. When this is the case, the
franchisor has no ability to actually control the guidelines if there are no repercussions for the
franchisee for failing to meet them. Similarly, with respect to vicarious liability of franchisors,
“[m]ost courts have found that retaining a right to enforce standards or to terminate an agreement
for failure to meet standards is not sufficient control . . . courts typically draw distinctions
between recommendations and requirements.”154 A “recommendation” may turn into a
mandatory requirement when the franchisee faces penalties or consequences if not followed.
The court must investigate whether a guideline, although not explicitly required, is more similar
to a requirement by the franchisor, if it places consequences for failed adherence.
A requirement of actual control would appeal to the proponents of the current joint
employer standard because it is narrows the scope of required control. It does not look to the
entire franchise agreement, the franchisor’s capacity to control certain elements, or the
franchisor’s recommendations. Actual control analyzes the conduct of the franchisor regarding a
specific guideline or procedure. For instance, if the franchisor provides a single wages guideline
to the franchisee that suggests payment to employees of no more than 5% above than minimum
wage, but does not enforce such guideline, then there will not be actual control by the franchisor.
If the franchisee does not follow this recommendation and the franchisor continually suggests
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methods or puts some form of pressure on the franchisee to adhere to this suggestion, then it will
be more like a requirement and, therefore, actual control in the subject of wages.
The courts cannot evaluate the franchisee-franchisor relationship through the exchange of
documents that allow the franchisor to observe plentiful control. The documentation is to ensure
the integrity of its brand. Looking at the actual control through the conduct of the franchisor is
narrow in scope because it requires the franchisor to exercise control (and not just retain the right
to exercise control) regarding guidelines and not merely to have it in the written documents as a
contingency to protect its liability.
Once effective and actual control has been established the court must inquire whether the
control concerns the instrumentality of the complaint. Borrowing again from the doctrine of
vicarious liability, this proposed standard must insure that the franchisor controlled the exact
element that lead to the harm or allegation. In New York, for example, it is well-settled that a
“franchisor typically is found to be vicariously liable only in situations where it exercised
considerable control over the franchisee and the specific instrumentality at issue in a given
case.”155 For example, a Dunkin Donuts, a franchisor, was not held to be vicariously liable when
a cashier at a franchisee’s establishment was raped and attacked by entrants because the
franchisor did not require specific security measures of its franchisees.156 Although the
franchisor in that case had made recommendations about security measures the Court held that
since these were recommendations and not requirements, security was out of the scope of
effective and actual control of the franchisor and therefore it was not vicariously liable.157
Applying this standard in the context of the NLRA will be a simple extension of this doctrine.
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If a franchisor requires that franchisees institute a policy to prohibit collective activity of
Section 7 of the NLRA and an aggrieved employee seeks to hold the franchisor responsible for
this apparent unfair labor practice. It will be apparent that the instrumentality of the injury is
controlled by the franchisor and therefore, if that control is effective and actual, it shall be a joint
employer in the action.
Part V: Conclusion
Because traditional notions of the American workforce and the employer-employee
relationship have blurred in the last half-century, the joint employer doctrine was created. This
doctrine enables employees to hold the appropriate party responsible for their grievances under
the NLRA. Franchises’ unique model with inherent autonomy of the franchisees and control by
the franchisors calls for a unique standard that is as malleable as the modern workplace. A joint
employer standard for franchises that examines a franchisor’s effective and actual control in the
instrumentality that is the subject of the employees’ complaint would help achieve equity for the
aggrieved part, franchisees, and franchisors and provides a solid framework to evaluate the
circumstances while also maintaining fluidity to adapt to the modern workplace and business
models.

